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INTRODUCTION
The growing integration of European financial markets
and the financial crisis of 2007-09 have raised important
questions concerning the institutional design of European
financial supervision. Over 50 large financial institutions
have significant cross-border operations in EU states, while
wholesale capital markets are increasingly inter-connected
across EU states through electronic exchanges and other
complex trading systems. Over the last 10 years, EU
financial legislation has grown dramatically in its scope of
coverage and application to many areas of market practice.
The implementation and enforcement of this legislation
has been left ultimately to the discretion and authority of
Member State supervisors based on the principle of home
country control and mutual recognition. Although this
legal and supervisory framework facilitated cross-border
trade and investment across EU states, the adoption of the
euro and the institutional consolidation of the Lamfalussy
process have led to calls for further consolidation of
supervisory practices at the EU level.  Moreover, the recent
financial crisis has demonstrated the importance of having
a robust macro-prudential supervisory framework and
micro-prudential supervisory regime with the objective of
controlling systemic risk.  
The European Commission has proposed a significant
institutional restructuring of EU financial supervision that
involves the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board to
monitor macro-prudential risks and three EU supervisory
authorities to adopt a regulatory code and to oversee
Member States’ micro-prudential supervision. The
Commission proposals, if approved by the EU Parliament,
will lead to significant institutional consolidation at the EU
level.  This will bring important changes to the existing EU
framework of financial supervision that is based on home
country control and mutual recognition. It also has
important implications for international supervisory and
regulatory arrangements because the proposed EU
financial supervisory authorities (ESAs) and ESRB are
likely to play a significant role in setting the international
regulatory agenda.  The overarching philosophical rationale
for designing the ESRB/ESA institutional structure is that
systemic risk and financial instability create negative
externalities in European financial markets and it is a
necessary policy objective of the European Union
institutions to control financial risks that can threaten the
efficient operations of the internal market.
This article discusses generally how the growing
integration of EU financial markets and the cross-border
nature of systemic risk justify a more consolidated
institutional model of EU financial supervision.  In doing
so, it will address some of the advantages and disadvantages
of other models, including the proposal for a single EU
supervisor. The nature of systemic risk in liberalised
financial markets creates significant risks for supervisors
and policymakers seeking to protect their economic and
financial systems from the fallout of financial failure. This
article suggests that the cross-border nature of European
financial markets and consequently the cross-border risks
posed by financial instability necessitate a re-examination
of the institutional design of European financial
supervision.    
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND
SYSTEMIC RISK   
The causes of the recent crisis have been attributed to
macroeconomic factors, major weaknesses in corporate
governance in financial institutions, and serious regulatory
failings. The costs of the crisis for EU Member States have
been enormous.  In the UK, the cost of the crisis in terms
of lost output and lower economic growth has been
estimated at more than 19 per cent of UK GDP. It is
evident that poorly regulated financial markets can lead to
huge social costs for the broader economy and that these
social costs in regional and globalised markets can be
exported to other economies. Indeed, EU states are
members of the European Union’s internal market with
free capital flows and fully liberalised trade in financial
services which brings economic benefits but also social
costs when markets fail for the economies of EU states. For
example, the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland
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demonstrated how the risk-taking of a Member State bank
can generate cross-border externalities to other EU
countries and financial systems. It is essential therefore that
Europe have a more comprehensive framework for
regulating and controlling the social costs (otherwise
known as “negative externalities”) of financial risk-taking.
These externalities can be transmitted more easily
throughout EU financial markets because of the greater
degree of financial integration in recent years due to
financial liberalisation in the internal market.      
A vast literature has emerged documenting the growing
integration of European financial markets (Adam et al,
2002; Cabral et al, 2002; Barros et al, 2004; ECB 2008 &
2009; Commission 2009). Following adoption of the euro,
there has been significant convergence in interest rate
differentials in the wholesale banking and inter-bank
markets. Although retail financial markets remain mostly
fragmented, the cost of capital for equity and debt issuance
has experienced a significant degree of convergence across
EU states, while the composition of asset classes in most
regulated investment funds has become less home-biased
towards the domestic market.  However, since the global
financial crisis began in 2007, the 27 EU states have had
wider dispersions in their cost of capital – the European
Commission, European Financial Integration Report 2009,
Brussels December 11, 2009, Commission Staff Working
Document, p 4. The report also notes that the dispersions
in cost of capital between EU countries began to converge
more in the last half of 2009, presumably in response to
the stock market’s recovery in the second quarter of 2009.   
The evolution of EU markets to more integrated
structures based on liberalisation of capital restrictions and
trade in financial services has been facilitated by the
growing importance of the euro as a reserve currency and
advances in technology that enable market participants to
operate more easily in a cross-border environment.  The
challenge arising from the increasing integration of
European and global financial markets and the recurrence
of financial crises, such as the crisis  that began in 2007, is
how to strike the right institutional balance between EU
institutions and Member States in the regulation and
supervision of financial markets. (see Edy Wymeersch
(2009), “The Structure of Financial Supervision in
Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks
and Multiple Financial Supervisors,” European Business
Organization Law Review 8: 237-306 (stating that
“regulation” refers essentially to rule-making, while
“supervision” involves applying the rules and judgment to
a specific case). In the EU, most financial regulation is
based in the Member State where the financial firm is
incorporated or has a headquarters.  Supervision is based
on the principle of home country control in which the
supervisor of the jurisdiction where the bank is chartered
or incorporated exercises extraterritorial regulatory
responsibility over the bank’s EU operations.  However,
when an EU-based banking group has subsidiaries
operating in other EU states, the supervision of those
subsidiaries is exercised by the host state supervisor of the
jurisdictions where the subsidiaries are incorporated.         
The regulatory policy incentives of home country
regulators are to protect the depositors and creditors of
banks based in their home jurisdictions.  This works as
long as banking activities are largely confined to one
country – normally the country where the bank is
incorporated and has its home license. It has also worked
well for banking groups which have fragmented
management structures in which the management of
foreign subsidiaries is largely autonomous from the day-to-
day management of the parent group, hence allowing the
foreign subsidiaries’ management to deal independently
with host state supervisors.  
However, as global financial markets have become more
inter-connected, the structure of banking markets and
their management have changed significantly. Large
banking groups have been created from a growing number
of cross-border bank mergers. As a result, many banking
groups today have major operations in multiple
jurisdictions where they can pose systemic risk to a host
state banking system. In addition, large banks are
increasingly dependent on international capital markets for
much of their funding. Banking groups are also
progressively centralising a number of key functions at the
group level. For instance, risk management, liquidity
management, funding operations and credit control, are
typically exercised at the group level or in specialised
affiliates in order to gain economies of scale and synergies
in specialist operations. This also has led to the distinction
between branches and subsidiaries becoming blurred.  For
instance, it is no longer the case that a large subsidiary
bank operating in one jurisdiction will be allowed to stay in
business if its parent company bank defaults or fails in
another jurisdiction (at least not for the short-run). 
These market changes pose a number of challenges for
the existing EU regulatory and supervisory framework. A
financial crisis in Europe is now more likely to have
substantial cross-border implications than the financial
crises of the past. In response, the Commission proposed
in 2009 several regulations that are now before Parliament
and which build on the De Larosiere Commitee’s Report
in February 2009 that recommended increased
institutional consolidation at the EU level to enhance
micro-prudential supervision of cross-border financial
institutions and macro-prudential surveillance of systemic
risk in the broader EU financial system.  
The home country control model
EU legislation has traditionally applied the principle of
home country control to the cross-border operation of
banks and other financial institutions, which holds that
regulatory authority over banks that conduct activities
through their branches in other member “countries” lies 3
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with the competent authorities in the EU/EEA state where
the institution’s head office is incorporated: see Council
Directive 89/299/EEC of the European Parliament and
Council of April 17, 1989, OJ 1989 L 124, p 16; and
Council Directive 89/646/EEC of the European Parliament
and Council of December 15, 1989 (OJ 1989 L 386, p 1);
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and
Council of March 20, 2000 relating to the taking up and
pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ 20000 L
126, p 1. Reference should also be made to Peter Paul and
others v Federal Republic of Germany, judgment of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, Case C-222/02,
October 12, 2004 (recognising that Member State national
authorities had a number of supervisory obligations
pursuant to EU law vis-à-vis credit institutions and the
exercise of those obligations throughout the Community
based on the principle of home country control).
According to minimum harmonisation, Member States
are required to harmonise what are considered to be the
essential areas of banking regulation while being free to
surpass these essential minimum standards and to maintain
higher distinctive regulatory practices in areas not
harmonised so long as they are pursuing valid public policy
objectives and do not unnecessarily infringe on EC Treaty
freedoms: see Caixa-Bank France v Ministere de l’ Economie, des
Finances et de l’ Industrie, judgment of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, C-442/02, October 5, 2004
(invalidating a French legislative prohibition on the
payment of interest for “sight” accounts for a French
subsidiary of a holding company based in another EU state
because it constituted an unnecessary restriction on
freedom of establishment for the holding company, though
the French government justified its prohibition on  the
grounds of consumer protection and promoting medium
and long-term savings). The effective application of the
home country principle based on minimum standards and
mutual recognition is premised on the pursuit of common
regulatory objectives and trust between regulatory
authorities.
EC financial services Directives have traditionally
adopted a functionalist approach to financial regulation by
requiring the same type of activity to be subject to the same
regulatory rules, even though the activity may be
performed by different types of financial institutions (eg
universal bank or investment bank): see First Banking
Directive (1977), article 1; Second Banking Directive
(1989), article 1(6). Moreover, EC legislation does not
require Member States to adopt a particular institutional
structure of financial regulation (although this has changed
somewhat in the securities area, as EU states are now
required to establish a single enforcement authority to
enforce the Market Abuse Directive and a single listing
authority for all issuers to file prospectuses under the
Prospectus Directive. States may use a single regulator for
prudential supervision (ie the UK FSA or German Bafin)
or divide those responsibilities between two bodies, usually
a central bank for prudential regulation and a capital
market regulator for conduct of business (so-called “twin
peaks” approach, as in the Netherlands), or a three-pillar
institutional model (banking, insurance and securities)
along sectoral lines.  In some systems, the central bank
plays an important role in overall prudential supervision
and in regulating the clearing and settlement system (Italy),
while in other countries a regulator or supervisor exercises
these functions (the UK).
Nevertheless, the EU regulatory and supervisory
framework of home country control based on mutual
recognition and minimum standards has accomplished a
great deal in promoting the objectives of the European
internal market but has recently come under strain because
of growing integration in key areas of European banking
and capital markets and cross-border risk exposures.
Indeed, the credit and financial crisis that began in 2007
demostrates the cross-border nature of systemic risk in
global as well as EU financial markets through, for
instance, counterparty exposures in the money markets
and disruptions to the cross-border operations of many
large banking groups and financial conglomerates.  The
crisis has demonstrated the inadequacy of the EU’s existing
supervisory and crisis management framework.  
The Lamfalussy model and institutional
consolidation
The role of EU Member State institutions in regulating
financial markets has undergone significant changes as well
in recent years. The EU Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP) recognised the Lamfalussy four-level framework as
essential in achieving the EU Treaty objectives of an open
internal market for capital movement and trade in financial
services. The four levels consist of:(1) legislative proposals
of high level principles through the traditional EU co-
decision process; (2) based on the legislative proposals, EU
finance ministers agree to implementing measures for
Member States; (3) Member State regulators make
proposals to Level 2 finance ministers regarding the
implementing measures and then consult with each other
regarding implementation; and (4) national compliance
and enforcement (see Lamfalussy Committee, The Final
Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets, February 15, 2001, Brussels).
The process now applies to all major financial sectors,
including banking, securities, insurance and pension fund
management (Commission Decision 2001/527/EC (6 Jan
2001) (establishing Committee of European Securities
Regulators); Commission Decision 2004/5/EC (5 Nov
2003)(establishing Committee of European Banking
Supervisors); and Commission Decision 2004/6EC
(establishing Committee of European Insurance and
Operational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPs)). 
The three so-called Lamfalussy Level 3 networks
presently consist of the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR), the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors (CEBS), and the Committee of European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
(CEIOPS).  These three committees have been acting in a
regulatory capacity and prior to the crisis were successful
in expediting the regulatory standard-setting process by
making it more flexible and efficient.  The successful
operation of the regulatory networks depends on
cooperation and frequent contacts between Member State
supervisors. To this end, the committees have begun a
number of initiatives to increase cooperation and
convergence; but the changing structures of financial
markets necessitates further institutional coordination in
the Level 3 committees to address the growing cross-
border effects of financial crises and the cross-border
activities of large financial groups.    
The Lamfalussy programme does not create a legislative
competence to supervise financial markets at the European
level.  Indeed, the original Report of the Committee of
Wise Men in 2000 envisioned only two principal functions
for the Level 3 committees: (1) technical advice regarding
the development of implementing measures, and (2)
promotion of consistent implementation of Community
legislation and enhancement of convergence in EU
supervisory practices.  It is essentially a regulatory process
that relies on existing comitology procedures to develop
EU financial legislation based on proposals from national
finance ministers and regulators, in consultation with
industry. Although the early stages of implementation of
the Lamfalussy programme ignited some controversy
concerning the scope of legislative authority for EU
institutions, it has resulted in streamlined decision-
making, promoted a wide ranging dialogue with industry
and consumer groups and has disseminated its work and
proposals to all relevant stakeholders.  The Council and
Parliament have recognised the early success of the
Lamfalussy programmes and the ongoing work of the
networks of the three regulatory committees.  
The Lamfalussy framework has, however, been criticised as
being too slow and lacking the institutional capacity to respond
effectively to a cross-border financial crisis within the
European Union (Alexander et al, 2007).  Prior to the crisis,
EU authorities had recognised that the changing structure of
European financial markets and the cross-border operations of
large banking groups necessitated further institutional
consolidation at the EU level and in particular raised
important issues regarding how much authority the three Level
3 committees should be given in overseeing national
supervisors and cross-border firms and wholesale capital
markets: see CEBS and the European System of Central Bank’s
Banking Supervisory Committee (BSC) Joint Guidance
(2006) (extending the guidance role of the Level 3 committees
from “going-concern” activities to crisis management
cooperation). Moreover, the International Monetary Fund’s
surveillance reports identified the weak link in EU supervisory
arrangements to be the absence of a clear framework of
coordination between EU national supervisors with respect to
the oversight of the cross-border operations of financial groups
in EU states: IMF article IV Surveillance Report, (2007) p 27,
and see also IMF article IV Surveillance Report (2006) para12.
The recognised weaknesses in the EU institutional framework
of financial supervision became even more apparent in 2007
and 2008 when the credit crisis incapacitated wholesale
financial markets and EU supervisory authorities were unable
to respond in a coherent or effective manner.
Macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervision 
A major weakness in the Lamfalussy framework and in
most EU Member States’ prudential regulation was that
supervisory practices were focused primarily on individual
financial firms and investors, while not taking into account
broader macro-economic factors, such as aggregate levels
of risk in the financial system or how risk was being shifted
to non-bank firms and investors in the broader capital
markets.  Supervisory practices were focused narrowly on
individual firms, while neglecting structural developments
in capital markets and in clearing and settlement systems.
For instance, one of the major failures in UK regulation
over the last 10 years was that prudential regulation was
too market-sensitive; it focused on the individual
institution and did not take into account the level of risk or
leverage building up in the whole financial system.  The UK
FSA’s supervisory approach was largely microprudential,
that is, that if individual firms were managing their risk
appropriately, then the financial system would be stable.
This failed to take into account the fallacy of composition
that what appears for individual firms to be rational and
prudent actions in managing their own risk exposures
under certain circumstances can, if followed by all firms,
potentially produce imprudent or sub-optimal outcomes
for the whole financial system.
In the case of the UK, excessive reliance on principles-
based regulation (PBR) also exacerbated weaknesses in the
UK supervisory framework. The PBR approach focused on
incentivising individual firm to experiment with different
risk management practices so long as they achieved
satisfactory firm outcomes that were measured by firm
performance (ie shareholder prices) and whether the FSA’s
11 high level principles were being achieved (ie treating
customers fairly).  The FSA’s PBR approach did not take
into account the aggregate effect of firms’ performance on
the financial system in terms of leverage generated and
liquidity risks from wholesale funding exposures. To
address adequately these macro-prudential risks in the
future, prudential regulation will necessarily become more
rules-based at the level of the firm and at the level of the
financial system.
The De Larosiere Report (2009) and the UK FSA’s Turner
Review (2009) support the creation of a macro-prudential
regulatory regime that is directly linked to the micro-
prudential oversight of individual firms. Macro-prudential
regulation will change regulation for individual banks in two
main areas: (1) the regulation of individual firms must take 5
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into account both firm level practices and broader macro-
economic developments in determining how regulatory
requirements will be applied to firm risk-taking (ie linking
the growth of asset prices and GDP with contra-cyclical bank
reserves and liquidity ratios), and (2) limitations on the type
of financial products and investments offered because of
controls on the overall levels of risk-taking and leverage at
the level of the financial system (ie limits on loan-to-value
and loan-to-income ratios). Implementing macro-prudential
regulation will require that micro-prudential regulation
become more rules-based because tighter ex ante constraints
will be needed for the risk exposures of individual firms (ie
leverage ratios and limits on maturity mismatches in
wholesale funding). Prudential regulation will gradually
become more rules-based in order to achieve macro-
prudential objectives. Macro-prudential regulation will
change the nature of PBR because the supervisory focus will
be expanded to include the application of macro-prudential
controls to the broader financial system.  Naturally, this will
create new incentives for market participants to avoid the
requirements by adopting new financial instruments and
structures which may lead to new regulatory risks.
Supervisors and central banks should be vigilant therefore as
to how the market may respond to new macro-prudential
controls.  
The new focus on macro-prudential supervision will
require supervisors to engage in surveillance of the
financial system by monitoring aggregate leverage in the
markets, the inter-connectedness between firms (large and
small) in wholesale funding markets, and the impact of
monetary policy on financial markets.  Supervisors will also
have to take into account macro-prudentual factors in
deciding how to apply micro-prudential controls on
individual firms. Any consideration of a future model of
EU supervision must take into account the links between
micro-prudential regulation of individual firms and macro-
prudential oversight of the financial system.
Macro-prudential supervision and the central bank’s
role
Most central banks have a mandate to assess and
monitor financial stability which necessarily involves them
in collecting supervisory information from banks and
financial markets.  A central bank would be well-situated to
conduct macro-prudential supervision because it has
access to data on the economy and financial markets –
comprising both market intermediairies, markets and
market infrastructures. Wide access by central banks to
supervisory information renders their financial stability
assessment more accurate and effective in forecasting and
monitoring systemic stresses.  Similarly, supervisors may
find the macro-prudential assessment useful in providing
them with information to monitor certain categories of
risk.  The central bank can more effectively discharge its
financial stability functions – ie overseeing the payment
and settlement systems – by having access to micro-
prudential data, while supervisors (whether inside or
oustide the central bank) can enhance their risk
assessments of individual firms by using macro-prudential
data.  This two-way flow of information between central
banks and supervisors is the basis for the Financial Stability
Forum’s 2008 report suggesting enhanced interaction and
exchange of information between central banks and
supervisors.
This type of interplay between macro-prudential
assessors and micro-prudential supervisors has not
occurred in the EU states where central banks are
prohibited from conducting micro-prudential supervision
and are left with the broader macro-prudential tasks of
overseeing the payment and settlement system, monetary
policy, and financial stability assessments. This is the case
with the European Central Bank (ECB) which is expressly
prohibited from engaging directly in prudential
supervision under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Nevertheless
it has responsibility to “contribute to the smooth conduct
of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the
stability of the financial system” (Art 127 (5) TFEU).  How
might the ECB “contribute to the smooth conduct of
policies” in the Eurosystem and throughout the EU
without having access to supervisory information? An
examination of the EU legal framework applicable to the
exchange of information between central banks and
supervisory authorities suggests that the EU regime is
“asymmetric” because although the ECB and European
System of Central Banks are obliged to contribute to the
smooth functioning of supervisory policies, supervisory
authorities do not have an equivalent responsibility to
contribute to the tasks of the ECB or ESCB.  Until this
asymmetry is rectified, the EU will fail to have effective
macro-prudential supervision.
THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSALS FOR
MICRO-PRUDENTIAL AND MACRO-
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION  
The Commission’s legislative proposals build on the
proposals of the High Level committee chaired by Jacques
de Larosiere.  The proposed regulations to establish a
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) and a
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), consisting of three
ESAs,  will lead to significant institutional consolidation of
European financial supervision and macro-prudential
oversight.  The creation of a ESFS would lead to important
changes for  the operations and functions of the three Level
3 Lamfalussy committees by creating three ESAs with legal
personailty and authority to ensure consistent application of
EU financial legislation. The creation of a ESRB aims to
enhance EU Member States’ capacity to assess and monitor
systemic risks across European and global financial markets
and to obtain data from supervisors on large systemic
financial institutions and wholesale financial markets. 6
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European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
The ESRB was established to be the main body
responsible for macro-prudential oversight and surveillance
of EU financial markets. ESRB Regulation, article 3(1)
(proposed) states:
“The ESRB shall be responsible for the macro-prudential
oversight of the financial system within the Community in
order to prevent or mitigate systemic risks within the financial
system, so as to avoid episodes of widespread financial distress,
contribute to a smooth functioning of the Internal Market
and ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial sector
to economic growth.”
Despite its lack of formal institutional structure, it has a
broad remit to exercise a number of important functions in
the field of macroprudential oversight, including
monitoring sources of systemic risk and other risks to
financial stability across EU countries and financial sectors
and serving as an institutional voice for EU central bankers
in shaping and developing macroprudential supervisory
practices.  It also will interact with global financial stability
bodies to develop effective early warning systems.  The
ESRB will aim to identify and prioritise the risks and use
stress testing and other methodologies to analyse how they
can impact financial stability. 
The ESRB would consist of 61 representatives and
officials consisting of the EU central bank governors,
representatives of the European Supervisory Authorites,
the Economic and Finance Committee, and the European
Commission, all serving on a General Board. The ESRB
secretariat would be entrusted to the European Central
Bank; the legal basis of the Regulation is Article 114 of the
Treaty on European Union (as amended).
Under the proposal, the ESRB would monitor and
assess systemic risks arising from individual banks and
across the whole European financial system.  In doing so,
it will seek to draw connections between macro-economic
conditions and structural developments in financial
markets, and identify vulnerabilities with particular
institutions. The ESRB would also issue recommendations
and warnings to countries or financial groups or other
concerned entities and would report all recommendations
and warnings to the Council of Ministers. The ESRB would
devise specific follow-up procedures and “moral
incentives” to follow recommendations or explain why not.
The ESRB can inform the Council if unsatisfied with a
Member State or entity’s explanation and can conduct
“name and shame” publicity if necessary.  
The ESRB will be assisted by a steering committee that
will assist it in decision-making, reviewing and preparing
for meetings of the General Board, and monitoring the
ESRB’s work progress. The steering committee
membership will be the chair and vice-chair of the ESRB;
five other members of the General Board who are also
members of the General Council of the ECB (who will be
elected by and from the central bank members of the
General Board for two year periods); a member of the
European Commission; the Chairs of each of the ESAs; and
the president of the Economic and Financial Committee.
The Regulation confers a specific role for the European
Central Bank in the ESRB’s operation: the ECB’s President
and Vice President will serve on the ESRB Board. 
The ECB would provide the secretariat for the ESRB
while performing administrative, logistical and analytical
support. This would also include drawing on technical
advice from the 27 EU national central banks and
supervisors (see speech of Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo,
Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, January 22,
2010, p 4)
Some economists, however, have raised concerns that
the ESRB would not be able to perform its function of
identifying and monitoring systemic risk because there is
inadequate understanding of the causes of systemic risk
and that the proposed ESRB Regulation does not provide
any information on what systemic risk means and how to
measure it (see oral evidence of Jon Danielsson, The
Committee’s Opinion on proposals for European financial
supervision, House of Commons Treasury Committee
(Sixteenth Report of session 2008-09), Ev 1).  Accordingly,
it was argued that the design of the ESRB is flawed and
should be substantially revised.  In addressing this concern,
it is submitted that although systemic risk is difficult to
measure, and its causes are even more difficult to identify
precisely (especially for a future financial crisis), EU
policymakers should not conclude therefore that they
should not try to establish institutional frameworks to
monitor systemic risks across EU financial markets.
Indeed, the financial crisis demonstrates that macro-
prudential risks are evident in the European financial
system (see “Financial Supervision and Crisis Management
in the EU” (December 2007), K Alexander, J Eatwell, A
Persaud, and R Reoch, Commissioned Report for the
European Parliament Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs, pp 2-3, 17-18). Banks have exposure to
each other throughout Europe in the money markets
through a variety of risk exposures, and European policy-
making needs to have better surveillance of the systemic
risks posed by certain banking groups and financial
institutions that operate in Europe.  
The crisis also demonstrates that systemic risk arises in
the wholesale capital markets – especially through the
securitisation and the over-the-counter credit default swap
markets – as well as from individual financial institutions.
The Turner Review recognised that the sources of systemic
risk can be macro-prudential in nature and that this
necessitates that central banks and regulators establish
enhanced cross-border (international and European)
frameworks for identifying and monitoring macro-
prudential systemic risks and, in certain circumstances, for
issuing early warnings to affected countries.  The absence
of a consensus view on the sources of systemic risk 7
Amicus Curiae   Issue 82   Summer 2010
therefore does not preclude the design of effective cross-
border institutional structures to monitor and measure
systemic risks in European financial markets.  
Other critics raised the concern that the composition of
the ESRB was too heavily weighted in favour of central
bankers and in particular favouring the ECB and that the
ESRB lacks democratic accountability. Professor Willem
Buiter for example observed that a ESRB dominated by
EU central bankers should not be given such an important
role because over the last decade “the ECB, the
Eurosystem NCBs, and the rest of the national NCBs [had]
not exactly covered themselves with glory in the area of
macro-prudential supervision and regulation”: see “The
Committee’s Opinion on proposals for European financial
supervision”, House of Commons Treasury Committee,
(Sixteenth Report of session 2008-09) p 18.  Also, because
all decisions to bail out a bank or provide other crisis
assistance requires approval of national fiscal authorities,
finance ministries should also be represented on the ESRB.  
Nevertheless, the ESRB’s absence of legal personality
provides it with more institutional flexibility and scope to
fulfil its core functions and broad mandate to monitor the
whole European financial system.  It also allows the ESRB
to interact flexibly with the ESAs and Member State
supervisors to form a common framework of regulation
that allows for regulatory innovation to address evolving
market risks. However, the ECB’s integral role in providing
administrative support, and overseeing and discharging the
operations of the ESRB, is constrained by Article 114 (6)
TFEU that requires a unanimous vote by the Council for
the ECB to carry out any function for the ESRB that
directly involves the prudential supervision of financial
institutions. So the extent and scope of the ECB’s
secretariat role may be limited to functions not involving
macro-prudential supervision if not approved by a
unanimous vote in Council.
The European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS)
The ESFS would consist of a network of Member State
supervisors that would operate within three different ESAs
with responsibility for banking, insurance and securities
markets, respectively (Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council COM(2009) 503
(establishing a European Securities and Markets
Authority), COM(2009) 502 (establishing a European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), and
COM(2009) 501 (establishing a European Banking
Authority)). Each Member State supervisor would
continue to be responsible for discharging its supervisory
functions, but under the proposed regulations would have
to account for its supervisory practices to the relevant ESA.
Each ESA will be responsible for adopting a harmonised
rule-book, technical standards and guidance for the
application and implementation of EU financial legislation.
The ESAs would provide a point of contact for national
supervisors to interact and coordinate their oversight of
cross-border financial firms and address matters of mutual
concern between Member State supervisors and the ESAs.
The ESAs would perform specifically delegated tasks, such
as mediating disputes between supervisors and, if
necessary, resolving disputes. As discussed below, their
most important immediate responsibility would be to
formalise the operations of the colleges of supervisors
which presently oversee the cross-border operations of
Europe’s largest 50 or so banks and financial institutions.
The decision to build the ESFS along sectoral lines –
banking, securities and insurance – was influenced
significantly by the existing sectoral approach of the
Lamfalussy framework.  EU policy makers could have
diverged away from the Lamfalussy sectoral approach by
proposing instead to create a single EU financial supervisor
for all financial services, or alternatively a single EU
supervisor for each of the three financial sectors.  Rather,
the Commission chose to build directly on the existing
framework by transforming the three Level 3 supervisory
committees into more formalised institutional structures
with legal personality and the power to resolve disputes
between supervisors and to issue Directives enjoining
supervisors to bring their practices into compliance with
EU law and regulatory codes. This path-dependent
approach recognised that the transaction costs – both
institutional and political – would have been much higher
if EU policymakers had proposed a more dramatic
institutional shift away from the Lamfalussy framework.
Also, equally important, the use of the Lamfalussy
institutions on which to build the ESFS recognised that a
new formalised EU institutional structure was nevertheless
to be firmly and primarily anchored in Member State
competence to supervise financial markets.  The ESFS/ESA
framework builds on the existing decentralised Member
State supervisory approach by enhancing the ability of
supervisors to coordinate cross-border oversight along
with enhanced accountability to other Member States to
ensure faithful implementation of EU law.
Moreover, the proposed institutional framework
recognises the interdependence between micro- and
macro-prudential risks across EU financial markets and
the need to be accountable to the views of market
participants and all EU stakeholders, including financial
institutions, investors and consumers. It provides a more
consolidated and rational institutional design for linking
micro-prudential supervision of individual firms with the
supervision of the linkages between institutions and
between institutions and the broader financial system.  The
ESRB is expected to provide a broader perspective of the
financial system and to interact with supervisors in
monitoring and assessing system-wide risks.  In this
capacity, the ESRB would serve as the basis for developing
a more integrated EU supervisory structure that would
improve consistency in regulatory and supervisory
practices and approaches across EU/EEA states, thus
creating a level playing field and a more efficient regulatory8
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framework for controlling systemic risk and preventing
market failure
The ESFS and Colleges of Supervisors 
The ESFS would place greater emphasis on using
colleges of supervisors from EEA states to supervise the
operations of Europe’s largest cross-border banks and
financial institutions.  The proposed European Banking
Authority (formerly the Lamfalussy Level 3 Committee of
European Bank Supervisors (CEBS)) would have
responsibility for overseeing the implementation of
guidelines and decision-making procedures for the
colleges.  Membership of the colleges would include: All
EEA supervisors of subsidiaries; EEA supervisors of
branches recognised as significant; third country
supervisors with equivalent confidentiality provisions; and
central banks as appropriate. Moreover, the Capital
Requirements Directive (CRD) (Art 131a) provides the
legal basis for a single college for global EEA-based banks.
The main function of colleges will be to exchange
information between supervisors, coordinate
communication between supervisors of the financial
group, voluntary sharing and/or delegation of tasks, joint
decision on model validation (eg Basel II).  The colleges
will also be involved in joint risk assessment and joint
decision on the adequacy of risk-based capital
requirements. The planning and coordination of
supervisory activities for the financial group and in
preparation of and during emergency situations (ie crisis
management).  The ESAs will have oversight of the colleges
and will have authority through conciliation and mediation
to resolve disputes between member authorities in the
colleges.  Some concern has been expressed that this
power of conciliation and mediation might infringe
Member State fiscal autonomy, but the better view holds
that these concerns are exaggerated as the ESAs will only
be able to resolve disputes and devise rules and technical
standards for national supervisors based on existing EU
financial legislation.
The fiscal autonomy of Member States
The proposals for the ESFS and ESRB provide no
authority for EU institutions to order Member States to
spend taxpayer funds in a crisis (ie bail out a bank). Indeed,
the Commission proposals do not provide a crisis
management mechanism that would require a member
authority to use public funds in a crisis.  In other words,
the sovereignty of Member States with respect to their
fiscal prerogative to support ailing financial institutions has
not been intruded upon.  In fact, the fiscal safeguards
provision of article 23 of the ESA does not permit the ESAs
to take any measures under articles 10 or 11 that would
require a Member State to make fiscal expenditures. The
fiscal safeguards provision applies to the authority of the
ESAs to resolve disputes between member supervisors
under article 11.
Some Member State Parliaments, however, have
expressed concern that the fiscal safeguard provisions of
article 23 only apply to orders issued by an ESA under
articles 10 and 11, and that an ESA could potentially order
a member authority under some other article of the
regulations to take action that might involve fiscal
expenditure.  This possibility was pointed out with respect
to article 21 of the ESA regulations which authorises the
ESAs with Commission approval to order a member
authority to comply with a recommendation or warning
issued by the ESRB.  Council addressed these concerns by
amending the ESA regulations to make it clear that no order
of a ESA could require a Member State to use public funds.  
It should be noted however that pursuant to article 9 of
the regulations the ESA would have authority to order a
member authority to comply with existing EU financial
legislation and the ESA codes and technical standards
implementing such legislation, which may indirectly
involve the Member State spending public funds. The
relevant EU financial legislation which an ESA can order a
Member State to comply with are listed in the respective
regulations establishing a European Banking Authority, a
European Securities and Markets Authority, and a
European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority.
Another area of possible legal challenge concerns the
Commission’s use of Article 114 (ex art 95) of the Treaty
as the legal basis to adopt the regulations creating the ESAs
and the ESRB. Article 114 (ex art 95) authorises EU
institutions to create EU agencies and other EU bodies
with delegated powers to facilitate the harmonised
implementation of EU law.  However, the scope of
delegated authority under Article 114 to these EU
agencies/bodies is limited by the so-called Meroni doctrine
that holds that EU agencies cannot be delegated ultra vires
powers (that is, powers that are not conferred on EU
institutions) to implement EU law.  Moreover, ECJ
jurisprudence also prohibits EU institutions from
delegating intra vires powers to EU agencies or bodies if
such powers delegate substantial discretion to EU agencies
to adopt rules and standards or take other related decisions
to implement EU law.  For instance, the Commission’s
delegation of authority to the ESAs to promulgate a
harmonised EU regulatory code and technical standards
that create a level regulatory playing field between Member
States vests considerable decision-making authority in the
ESAs not only to devise a EU regulatory code but also to
decide if states and financial firms are in breach of the code
and to order the relevant Member State regulators to take
remedial action.  Although Commission approval must be
obtained before the ESA codes and standards become
effective, considerable discretionary rule-making and
enforcement authority has been delegated to the ESAs.  
These constitutional concerns have already been raised
by the UK Parliament (Treasury Committee Report, 2009)
and may possibly form the basis of legal challenges by
Member States or certain financial institutions subjected 9
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directly to the EU code. Nevertheless, these constitutional
concerns may legally be justified by the fact that EU
institutions can be authorised by qualified majority vote to
exercise certain limited competences in the supervisory
field and the proposed framework requires that the ESAs
consult and obtain the Commission’s approval before
imposing any order or Directive against a Member State or
a financial institution based in a Member State.    
Establishing a single EU supervisor?
Considerable support has emerged for a single EU
financial supervisor across financial sectors or for a sectoral
approach along the lines of banking, securities and insurance
(Andenas & Avgerinos 2003 (suggesting the ECB as
supervisor); Avegerinos 2003 (suggesting an EU SEC)
especially in light of the financial crisis (ESFRC 2009).  The
main argument for institutional consolidation at the EU level
is that Europe’s growing internal financial market is much
more integrated – both at the level of the financial system
and at the level of firms operating cross-border – which
cannot be supervised efficiently by Member States because of
different institutional capacities for implementation and
enforcement. A centralised supervisory body would promote
a level playing field in supervisory practices by overseeing the
activities of Member State authorities and coordinating and
conducting cross-border surveillance and enforcement.  The
creation of an EU supervisor could potentially reduce the
high transaction costs of monitoring and enforcing EU law
on a cross-border basis. Further, a single supervisor could
assist with resources and training for some member
authorities in need of assistance.  
Although there are recognised benefits to such a
centralised institutional structure, there are some concerns
regarding the sovereignty costs states would incur by
allowing such an authority to have jurisdiction to monitor
and enforce EU law in their jurisdictions. An extensive
literature has emerged questioning the utility and
effectiveness of the single supervisory model for Europe
(Vives 2001, Ferran, 2005). Moreover, on constitutional
grounds, there are critics who assert that the Commission
and EU bodies do not have a conferred power to engage in
prudential supervision or even macro-prudential
surveillance (House of Commons 2009)  According to this
view, the Meroni doctrine would prohibit the Commission
and Council from creating an EU agency and then
delegating powers to the agency to supervise EU financial
markets on the grounds that prudential supervision has not
been conferred by the Treaty on EU institutions and
therefore cannot be delegated to a newly created EU
supervisory agency.  
For those in favour of more institutional consolidation,
the Commission’s proposals to create the ESAs should be
welcomed because the Treaty would probably be
interpreted as prohibiting any further institutional
consolidation in supervision in the form of a single EU
supervisor for all financial markets or a single EU
supervisor along financial sector lines. Despite the
potential legal challenges on “delegation of power”
grounds, the exercise of financial supervision will remain
decentralised and based at the Member State level.  The
Commission’s proposals therefore may withstand
constitutional challenge because they maintain the essential
decentralised supervisory structure with Member States
exercising ultimate competence to supervise financial
markets while building lines of accountability to other EU
states through the European supervisory agencies.  
Nevertheless, there remains an important objection to
the proposals on public policy grounds that they do not go
far enough. In the aftermath of the crisis, there have been
proposals to establish a single EU supervisor for the largest
50 or so financial institutions with cross-border operations
throughout Europe.  Their significant regional, and indeed
global, scope makes them amenable to a transnational
supervisory structure that is consolidated at the European
level in the form of a single EU prudential supervisor that
would have full competence to supervise these firms and
their foreign branches and subsidiaries.  Similarly, a single
EU supervisor could also play an important role in
supervising the growing inter-connected infrastructure of
EU capital markets, in particular the clearing houses and
certain settlements systems that operate at EU level.  
As mentioned above, an important rationale for this is
that national supervisors have high transactions costs in
supervising the cross-border dimension of financial
markets and a single EU supervisor can reduce these
transaction costs by coordinating the activities of member
authorities. The rationale for this is not only that  it would
be extremely difficult for national supervisors to obtain a
clear picture of these institutions and their operations, but
even more because their potentially risky operations may
create significant cross-border externalities, which makes
supervising them solely by one national supervisor suffer
from a serious incentive problem. Further consolidation of
EU supervision, however, would not be permitted by the
Treaty. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty for the Effective
Functioning of the European Union crystallises this
institutional  limitation. But some argue that politicians
should address this absence of Treaty authority for creating
a single EU supervisor by amending the Treaty to allow this
to be done (ESFRC 2009). 
CONCLUSION 
European financial markets are increasingly integrated in
terms of cross-border operations of institutions and
wholesale capital markets and system infrastructure.  EU
financial regulation needs more effective supervision that
links micro-prudential supervision with macro-prudential
oversight of the financial system.  Although the European
Central Bank is responsible for contributing to the smooth
operation of eurozone payment systems, it is prohibited
legally from engaging in prudential supervision unless it
obtains unanimous support from EU states.  Therefore,10
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the more realistic debate regarding which supervisory
model to adopt for Europe involves the extent to which
institutional consolidation should occur based on the
Lamfalussy framework and the Commission’s proposals
which build upon it, or should a EU supervisor be created
that is not a central bank but has full competence to
supervise and regulate EU financial markets?  Any proposal
for the latter would be controversial and attract much
political criticism from many EU states and would legally
be unsound on Treaty grounds.  
In the meantime, the Commission’s proposals, though
institutionally complex, essentially maintain Member State
competence to supervise markets, but require supervisors to
coordinate their actions with respect to cross-border firms
and incorporating systemic risk concerns into their
supervisory practices.  Overall, the proposed ESFS and ESRB
are adequate institutionally to build an effective macro-
prudential supervisory framework that is durably linked to
micro-prudential supervsion.   However, simply creating new
EU institutions is not enough. EU policy makers should also
be concerned with the substantive requirements of financial
legislation and whether they are creating an incentive
compatible framework that limits systemic risk.  
Another important area that should be recognised is that
crisis prevention – through prudential supervision – and
crisis management – mitigating a crisis by resolution – are
part of a seamless process.  Effective prudential supervision
also requires effective crisis management mechanisms,
which include resolution procedures for banks and other
systemically important firms, policies regarding too big to
fail banks, and deposit insurance.  Indeed, the ESAs are not
authorised to engage in crisis management and would have
no authority to use public funds to resolve bank failures or
some other systemic problem involving a financial
institution. Therefore, their ultimate effectiveness can be
called into question. Is it really realistic to create EU
bodies with ex ante responsibilities for micro and macro
supervision while not having the authority to bail out,
nationalise, or unwind a large bank or engage in other
financial rescues?  The link between crisis prevention and
crisis management therefore should be high on the EU
policy agenda and without a better balance between the
two at the EU level the present proposals for institutional
reform will be ineffective. 
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